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Abstract: In the modern socially-driven, knowledge-based virtual computing environment in which
organisations are operating, the current digital forensics tools and practices can no longer meet the need for
scientific rigour. There has been an exponential increase in the complexity of the networks with the rise of
the Internet of Things, cloud technologies and fog computing altering business operations and models.
Adding to the problem are the increased capacity of storage devices and the increased diversity of devices
that are attached to networks, operating autonomously. We argue that the laws and standards that have been
written, the processes, procedures and tools that are in common use are increasingly not capable of ensuring
the requirement for scientific integrity. This paper looks at a number of issues with current practice and
discusses measures that can be taken to improve the potential of achieving scientific rigour for digital
forensics in the current and developing landscape.
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1. Introduction
Due to the modern socially-driven, knowledge-based virtual computing environment that
organisations are operating in, we argue that the processes, procedures and tools that have been
accepted and are commonly used in digital forensics can no longer meet the need for scientific rigour.
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), in its publication Information Operations[1], has defined the
Information Environment (IE) as “the aggregate of individuals, organizations and systems
(resources) that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.” The document concludes that
“the information environment is where humans and automated systems observe, orient, decide, and
act upon information, and is therefore the principle environment for decision making”.
The main attributes of the modern IE are:
• the physical and virtual size of it (large);
•

the rapid evolution as a result of the introduction of new technologies;

•

the great irregularity between physical and virtual boundaries of different stakeholders
and legal entities;

•

the transparent access to and control of assets;

•

the speed of information and knowledge exchange involving users across boundaries;
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the stealth and limited attribution because of technologies and legislation, the rapid
concentration of capability allowing for rapid generation and escalation of events;

•

the non-serial and distributed nature that allows the parallel execution of events against
multiple targets creating non-linear events.

2. Literature Review
The underlying principles that are applied to the digital forensic process were developed in the
1990s, but follow the general standard for the acceptability of evidence in a court of law that were
provided as a result of the 1923 Frye v. United States case. In this case, the admissibility of a systolic
blood pressure deception test as evidence was discussed. The Court in the Frye case held that expert
testimony must be based on scientific methods that are sufficiently established and accepted.
Later, in 1993, in the Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. United States Supreme Court
case (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 584-587.), the standards for admitting expert
testimony in U.S. federal courts were determined and the Court in this case held that the enactment
of the Federal Rules of Evidence implicitly overturned the Frye standard. The standard that the Court
articulated is referred to as the Daubert standard. This was given as:
• ‘Judge is gatekeeper’: Under Rule 702 (Testimony by Expert Witnesses), the task of
"gatekeeping", or assuring that scientific expert testimony truly proceeds from "scientific knowledge",
rests on the trial judge.
• Relevance and reliability: This requires the trial judge to ensure that the expert's testimony
is "relevant to the task at hand" and that it rests "on a reliable foundation". Concerns about expert
testimony cannot be simply referred to the jury as a question of weight. Furthermore, the
admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Rule 104(a), not Rule 104(b); thus, the Judge must
find it more likely than not that the expert's methods are reliable and reliably applied to the facts at
hand.
• Scientific knowledge = scientific method/methodology: A conclusion will qualify as
scientific knowledge if the proponent can demonstrate that it is the product of sound "scientific
methodology" derived from the scientific method.
• Illustrative Factors: The Court defined "scientific methodology" as the process of formulating
hypotheses and then conducting experiments to prove or falsify the hypothesis, and provided a set
of illustrative factors (i.e., not a "test") in determining whether these criteria are met:
1.

Whether the theory or technique employed by the expert is generally accepted in the
scientific community;

2.

Whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication;

3.

Whether it can be and has been tested;

4.

Whether the known or potential rate of error is acceptable; and

5.

Whether the research was conducted independent of the particular litigation or
dependent on an intention to provide the proposed testimony.’

After a number of other, relevant rulings, Rule 702 was amended in 2000 in an attempt to codify
and structure elements embodied in the "Daubert trilogy." The rule then read as follows:
• Rule 702. Testimony by Experts: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
www.aetic.theiaer.org
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as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise, if:
1.

the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,

2.

the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and

3.

the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

Then, again, in 2011, Rule 702 was amended to make the language clearer. The rule now reads:
• Rule 702. Testimony by Expert Witnesses: A witness who is qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise
if:
a.

The expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

b.

The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

c.

The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

d. The expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
While these are all US based cases, current best practice for digital forensics around the world,
for the most part, attempts to satisfy this standard. In the UK this is expressed in the Association of
Police Officers (ACPO) good practice guide Principles of Digital Evidence[2] 1.
In the USA, the Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWDGE) produced the SWGDE
Best Practices for Digital Evidence Collection[3] and the SWGDE Best Practices for Computer
Forensic Examination[4] (latest versions -2018) to give advice for the collection and processing of
digital evidence.
3. The ‘Scientific rigour of process’ paradox
The Daubert standard requires general acceptance of the theory and technique used in the
digital forensic process to be generally accepted by the scientific community and have been peer
reviewed. Considerable research has been undertaken into the theory that underpins the processes
in use but, unfortunately, for the most part it is dated and has not addressed the current technologies
and where it has, it has not been adopted in practice. The majority of the techniques that are used in
the digital forensic process have not satisfied the criteria of known error rates. Most of the main tools
that are in use are proprietary commercial products and there is no published data available on error
rates. Of more concern is that on the occasions when these tools have been tested, they have been
found to produce, in some cases, significantly different results[5-7]. The paradox is that due to lack
of a better solution, experts have shifted their risk homeostasis levels of what is acceptable for the
notions of ‘scientific’, ‘rigour’ and of ‘process’.
In the USA, the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) currently has 3 projects
running: the National Software Reference Library (NSRL), the Computer Forensic Tool Testing
(CFTT) and the Computer Forensic Reference Data Sets (CFReDS). They have also created a digital
forensic tool catalogue and state that “The primary goal of the Tool Catalog is to provide an easily
1

The Daubert Trilogy refers to the three key cases that established precedence for how judges

determine the admissibility of expert testimony. The three cases that make up the trilogy are: Daubert
v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 590 U.S. 579 (1993), General Electric Co. v Joiner, 522 U.S. 136
(1997) and Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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searchable catalog of forensic tools. This enables practitioners to find tools that meet their specific
technical needs.” However they caveat this with a cautionary note that “tool information is provided
by the vendor”.
•

The NSRL provides file profiles computed from this software (such as MD5 and SHA1 hashes) as a Reference Data Set (RDS) of information. The RDS can be used in the
forensic examination of file systems, for example, to speed the process of identifying
unknown or suspicious files.

•

The CFTT provides a methodology consisting of tool requirements specifications, test
procedures, test criteria, test sets, and test hardware.

•

The CFReDS provide to an investigator a documented sets of simulated digital evidence
items for examination.

In 2018, NIST published a document by the Organization of Scientific Area Committees for
Forensic Science (OSAC) entitled “A Framework for Harmonizing Forensic Science Practices and
Digital/Multimedia Evidence”[8] which states that “Like many other specializations within forensic
science, the digital/multimedia discipline has been challenged with respect to demonstrating that the
processes, activities, and techniques used are sufficiently scientific” The document then goes on to
detail the work carried out by the OSAC Task Group (TG).
There is now a considerable level of expertise and experience in the imaging of computer hard
disks.

While the volume of data that they might contain continues to grow, the underlying

technologies (electromechanical and solid state) have not seen significant disruption for a number of
years and disks that will work in one computer can normally be expected to work in another;
although there are exceptions. When dealing with mobile phones, tablet computers and other
devices, there is an increasing number of issues that include the range of operating systems and the
versions of them, and the number of manufacturers that do not apply common standards and,
indeed, seek to differentiate themselves.
There are now also an increasing range of products on the market that contain computer
processors and memory that may contain potential evidence and these can be classed as Internet of
Things (IoT) devices. Many of these have limited processing power and digital storage but may
contribute valuable evidence to an investigation or have been used in the commission of a crime. An
example of this is was reported in 2016[9], when more than 1.5 million CCTV cameras were hijacked
and used to carry a denial of service attack on a security website.
4. The Challenges of the Paradox
Some of the challenges we are now facing as a result of the characteristics of the modern
information environment are:
1.

Completeness. Given the increasing volume of data storage on all forms of media, with
computer hard disks now at 10 plus TB, USB storage devices at more than two Tb and
micro SD cards at 512 GB together with the issues created by cloud storage, the concept
of collecting a ‘complete’ set of the data is becoming increasingly problematic due to the
size of the storage media and the volume of data. There is now an issue of the time to
capture and process the volumes of data and issues of privacy when the data is being
collected from a server that holds the data of more than one person or organisation as a
result of the disparity between the physical and virtual boundaries of the stakeholders
www.aetic.theiaer.org
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and the increasing transparency of access to and control of the assets. If the ‘complete’
dataset is not collected there is the potential for an accusation of selective collection of
only the data that supports a case and the exclusion of exculpatory evidence. The
question, if we adopt an approach of selective collection, is how do we guarantee that all
relevant data has been collected and how do we ensure that the process is repeatable?
More of the point, because of the developing technological environment, the speed of
information exchange across logical boundaries and the non-serial and distributed nature
of processing that may create non-linear events will have greatly changed after the initial
collection of data, rendering our process non-applicable and outdated.
2.

Live forensics. This is when the artefacts are being discovered and captured on a live
running system from volatile memory. The main purpose is to acquire volatile data that
would otherwise get lost if the computer system was turned off or would be overwritten
if the computer system were to remain turned on for a longer period. As the size of RAM
in computer devices increases, so does the potential volume of data that may be of value
as evidence that it may contain. The very action of capturing the data stored in RAM is
likely to result in changes to elements of the data and as a result, a second attempt to
image the logical device will be on the changed data and as a result, will generate a
different MD5 or SHA hash value. While the reality of this has been accepted in practice,
it falls short of the requirement for a scientific methodology. More of the point, paging,
caching and true distribution of processing and storage, combined especially with the
potential for the rapid concentration of capability and non-serial and distributed
processing, challenge the underlying principles and foundations of live forensics and the
quality of data that can be collected.

3.

Volatility. Associated with the ongoing development of existing technologies, the
introduction of new technologies and the speed of data exchange, increasingly across
international boundaries, together with the increased use of devices that contain an everincreasing capacity of volatile memory and an increasing number of devices with limited
volatile storage and processing capability (mostly IoT devices), the potential volume and
life of potential evidence is moving, at the same time, to two extremes. For devices with
an increasing size of volatile memory, there is not only the potential for evidence, but also
that it will exist for longer before the storage space is overwritten. For the IoT devices,
with limited storage, potential evidence may be transitory and only exist for a very short
period of time but again, once the data is captured, it may not be possible to repeat the
process and get the same result.

4.

Logical versus physical acquisition. With the increasing storage capacity of mobile
devices (tablets, mobile phones, drones, fitbits, etc.) there is the potential for significant
volumes of data and potential evidence. However, for many of these devices, it is not
possible to extract an image of the physical device that would include all of the device
settings and we are often limited to obtaining an image of the logical device which will
normally only give the user data. One of the issues here is that capturing the logical image
of this type of device will normally result in the process not being repeatable as a number
of the files that are contained are constantly changing and, similar to live forensics, a
second attempt to create an image of the logical device will result in a different MD5 or
www.aetic.theiaer.org
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SHA hash value. While the reality of this has been accepted in practice, it falls short of
the requirement for a scientific methodology.
5.

The increasing diversity of devices and the range of operating systems is directly linked
to the speed of evolution that is taking place, the introduction of new technologies and
the increasing transparency of access to and control of assets. Prior to the introduction of
the Android operating system in 2007, the forensic investigator was most likely to
encounter either the Windows, Linux or the Apple Operating systems for most computers
and the Windows, Apple and Blackberry OS for most mobile phones. In the period, since
then, with the introduction of a wide range of IoT devices, another 8 operating systems[10]
have come into use. Each of these adds a level of complexity and the requirement of
knowledge and experience in how to deal with the capture of data and subsequent
analysis.

6.

The Cloud. Cloud computing has been a significant advance in the information
technology (IT) services that are available today. One of the issues with the Cloud is that
the Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) have not been open and allowed their customers see
how the Cloud environment that they are offering works. This lack of transparency is an
issue in digital investigations. In addition, jurisdiction, data duplication and multitenancy in the cloud platforms will add to the challenge of locating, identifying and
separating the data relating to suspect activity or the targets of attacks for digital forensic
investigations. At the present time, the approaches that are taken to evidence collection
and recovery of evidence in a traditional non-cloud environment do not map well into a
Cloud environment as they rely on physical and unrestricted access to the relevant system
and user data. This is not possible in the cloud environment due its decentralized data
processing and storage.

It is increasingly clear that the concepts of traditional digital forensics cannot be directly used
in cloud systems. In particular, the distributed processing and multi-tenancy nature of cloud
computing, as well as its highly virtualized and dynamic environment, make the identification of
digital evidence and its preservation and collection difficult. In agreement with Biggs and Vidalis[11],
the development of the Cloud environment was not undertaken with digital forensics and evidence
integrity in mind, and as a result it is a challenging technically, logistically and legally.
In cloud computing the forensic process needs to be carried out in three distinct areas; Client
system forensics, Cloud forensics and Network forensics. The Client system forensic process is well
understood and practiced and is the ‘traditional’ forensics.
Cloud server forensics, although not a new concept, greatly adds to our paradox with the issues
of multi-tenancy, physical inaccessibility and unknown location of the artefacts to be collected and
this can lead to jurisdictional issues. The artefacts may include user data, system logs, application
logs, user authentication and access information, database logs etc. In a highly decentralized and
virtualized cloud environment it is quite common for data to be located in multiple data centres
located in different geographic locations[12]. Traditional approach to seizing the system is not
practical in the cloud environment, even if the location is known, as the effect would be
disproportionate and could bring down whole data centre, affecting a large number of other users
due to multi-tenancy. A number of research papers have discussed this issue and some possible
solutions[12-16]. The problem of governance is another significant issue in cloud forensics as
www.aetic.theiaer.org
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discussed in the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) cloud computing risk
assessment report, which highlights the ‘loss of governance’ as one of the top risks of cloud
computing, especially in Infrastructures as a Service (IaaS)[17]. In IaaS, users have more control and
relatively unfettered access to the system logs and data, whereas in the Platform as a Service (PaaS)
model their access is limited to the application logs and any pre-defined APIs provided, and in the
Software as a Service (SaaS) model the customers have little or no access to such data. As the
customers increasingly rely on the CSPs to provide the functionality and services they, of necessity,
give more control of their information assets to the CSPs. As the customers relinquishes control, they
inevitably lose access to important data and as a result it is not available for identification and
collection for any subsequent forensic needs[12]. As the degree of control decreases, there will be less
data of forensic value available for investigations and as a result there is a greater dependency on the
CSPs in order to gain access to such data. This will also be dependent on the Service Level Agreement
(SLA) that the customer has with the CSP are what they are capable of and willing to provide. In a
traditional server based environment, where the physical locations of the systems are known, the
investigators can have full control over the forensic processes. In a cloud environment, there is a high
likelihood of evidence being overwritten or modified at any given time, since the cloud platforms are
subject to constant and rapid changes. This highlights the importance of preserving the evidence as
soon as it is identified, using appropriate and acceptable preservation techniques.
Traditional network forensics deal with the analysis of network traffic and the logs that systems
produce for tracing events that have occurred. Network forensics is theoretically also possible in
cloud environments. The TCP/IP protocol layers can, potentially, provide information on
communications between Virtual Machine (VM) instances within cloud and also with instances
outside the cloud. CSPs do not normally provide the network traces or communication logs generated
by the customer instances or applications despite the fact that such logs may be critical element of
data for a forensic investigation[13]. In addition, the Virtual Machine (VM) instances may be subject
to movement within a data centre, outside one data centre to a different data centre in the same
jurisdiction or to a data centre located in a separate jurisdiction, based upon many factors such as
load balancing, business continuity etc. Such moves, carried out by the CSPs, are completely outside
the control of the client. This also adds additional challenges to the cloud server-side forensics.
It is not only the digital evidence itself that needs to be acceptable to any court of law, but also
the processes followed in the conduct of an investigation. In the last two decades, academic
researchers and forensic practitioners have proposed a significant number of digital forensic
frameworks and previously published processes and frameworks have been refined, resulting in a
variety of digital forensic process models and terminology. While this can be seen as a natural
development to meet the changes in technology and the law, it results in a lack of standardisation in
the processes and procedures adopted. At the same time the volume and diversity of devices that
have digital processing and storage have continued to expand rapidly with the result that there has
not been adequate research carried out on these devices to establish scientifically sound methods for
the extraction of evidence.
4. The Tools and Their Provenance
Throughout the digital forensics landscape, there are a number of tools that have been widely
used and accepted for use in digital forensic imaging and analysis. The National Institute of Justice,
www.aetic.theiaer.org
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in the USA, in conjunction with another of other agencies, including NIST, has carried out some
excellent work on tests on a significant number of commercial data acquisition and imaging tools and
publicised reports on their operation. For the analysis and reporting phases of an investigation, the
main tools in use are also, for the most part, commercially developed, and while there is de-facto
acceptance of their capabilities, there is increasing concern with regard to their veracity. In a number
of recent research publications, significant differences have been noted in the output of these tools,
both from version to version of the tool and in comparison to the output of other tools. As these tools
are commercially developed and have been well marketed and accepted as de-facto standard tools in
the community, there has not been the any level of independent testing of their functionality. The
practitioners have no visibility of whether it has been subjected to peer review, whether it can be and
has been tested and whether there is a known or potential rate of error that would be acceptable. For
the open source tools, some of the same issues are also true, although, potentially, the access to the
source code would allow for experimentation and testing and the ability to determine error rates.
The accepted practice to validate the evidence that is to be presented is to use the dual tool
approach, where two separate tools are used to confirm that the evidence is accurate. Unfortunately,
this approach has a number of issues. Without knowing the algorithms that have been used in the
tools that are being used, there is no way to ascertain that they are not using the same algorithm and
are, in effect, self-validating. The other, more pragmatic issue is that of resources. To use two tools
for each task would double the cost and also the workload of practitioners who already cannot deal
with the workloads caused by the other issues detailed above.
According to Statista.com, 364.59 million Hard Disk Drives (HDDs) shipped globally in the first
three quarters of 2015, and a figure of 416.7 million HDDs and 153.8 million Solid State Drives (SSDs)
was projected for the whole of 2015. The average size of the Seagate HDDs is now over one terabyte.
Based on these statistics, we can assume that a typical case would require Law Enforcement Agency
(LEA) Officers to collect, on average, more than 1TB of data (including CDs, DVDs, internal and
external HDDs/SSDs) for each case. The automated procedures that can be used to assist in the
processing of this data, such as file signature analysis and hash analysis, are employed. Apropos, a
large amount of data has to be manually analysed. Even before the analysis stage, there is a lot of
work to be undertaken. Forensically wiping one Samsung HD105SI 1TB drive, using a tableau TD2u,
was achieving an average of a 6.6GB/min transfer rate and a projected turnaround time of 2h 30
minutes. Furthermore, in a recent disk study the authors performed, a large number of hard disks
were acquired and forensically analysed. The average acquisition transfer rate that was achieved was
2.76GB/min. This translates on an average time investigators would need to spend in the acquisition
phase of at least 6 hours per disk.
After the acquisition of the devices, a forensic analyst will get to the analysis phase, where,
depending on the case, they will perform any/all of the following activities:
•

Disk geometry analysis (number, size and type of partitions (deleted or not))

•

Time-zone analysis

•

Operating System analysis

•

Hash analysis

•

File signature analysis

•

Registry analysis

•

Compound file analysis
www.aetic.theiaer.org
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Log file analysis

•

Internet artefacts analysis

•

Email analysis
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Following the above, more specific analytical steps will have to be performed (the list is not
meant to be comprehensive):
•

Deleted files recovery

•

Identification of USB devices that were ever connected and when they were connected

•

Identification of files and folders that have been exfiltrated

•

CD/DVDS that may have been burned

•

Websites visited and by which user account

•

Lists of recently used programs, the files they have accessed, and when they have done
so

•

Programs that have been installed and uninstalled

•

Attempts at data destruction/hiding

•

Program settings that can deduce knowledge of an act or technology

•

What programs start when the computer starts and any related DLLs, cross-examining
findings for the identification of malware footprints

•

How many times a program has ever been run and by which user account

•

Wi-Fi connection points that have been accessed and when

•

Hidden email and other internet accounts

•

Identify and analyse photos and deduce the geographic location of where photos were
taken

•

What particular user performed a task (related to the above activities or to case specific
activities)

Nowadays, most of the above analytical tasks have been automated. Still, depending on the
datasets used, the analysis phase will take an average of two days per disk to complete. This translates
in two days per disk before the forensic analyst will be able to start the manual analytical activities,
the file indexing and any case-specific raw searches. It also translates in two days that physical
computing resources will have to be locked down and assigned to the execution of the
aforementioned tasks.
5. Potential solutions
The constant introduction and development of new technologies and their adoption in all
environments means that frameworks, procedures and tools need to be constantly reviewed and
developed to meet the environment in which they are required to work.
Currently, ISO 17025:2017 (General requirements for the competence of testing and calibration
laboratories) is being widely used to standardise the policies, processes and procedures within digital
forensic laboratories. In reality, while there is logic in the use of this standard, it is not fit for purpose.
As the title suggests it is for testing and calibration laboratories and was not developed with the
digital forensic environment in mind. Consideration should be given to developing a specific
standard to meet the current and developing environment of digital forensics.
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While it is recognised that the testing of analysis and reporting tools, particularly in a rapidly
changing technological environment where new versions of tools are being developed on a regular
basis is both expensive and time consuming, an international effort should be undertaken to fulfil
this requirement. The work that the NIJ and NIST has undertaken in the area of digital forensics is
of huge value, but does not currently go far enough. One current initiative that may address some of
the issues is the Cyber-investigation Analysis Standard Expression (CASE). This is a communitydeveloped evolving standard, which is aimed at serving the needs of the widest possible range of
cyber-investigation domains, including digital forensic science, incident response, counter-terrorism,
criminal justice, forensic intelligence and situational awareness. The underlying motivation for this
initiative is that of interoperability in the exchange of cyber-investigation information between tools
and organizations. CASE aligns with and extends the Unified Cyber Ontology (UCO) which is
intended to support information integration and cyber situational awareness in cybersecurity
systems.
The development of ISO/IEC 27037:2012 —Guidelines for identification, collection, acquisition
and preservation of digital evidence, addresses the need for a stand for these phases of an
investigation, but does not address the issues with the tools that are used and later phases of an
investigation.
In support of CASE and UCO, we need to manage the paradox discussed in the previous section
and the risks that it introduces. As with any risks, we can accept, we can mitigate, we can insure
against or we can avoid completely. High frequency and high impact risks must be avoided. Low
frequency low impact risks may be accepted. Low frequency high impact risks and high frequency
low impact risks should be mitigated by procedural and technical solutions underlined by
intelligence operations principles.
Paraphrasing Clausewitz, by intelligence we mean any sort of information about the potential
suspects and their operational environment (linked to actus-reus and mens-rea).
Today, investigators need to have forensic intelligence[18-19], even for the simplest and most
trivial computer-related crime, that can lead to forensic evidence which, when combined, can lead to
a strong supporting case for a prosecution. Such intelligence can be used either in a pro-active or in
a re-active manner. As a concept, this is not new. It was first introduced and discussed a number of
decades ago[20-21]. For example, in the UK, ENDORSE (National Crime Agency 2015) is a nationwide forensic and law enforcement initiative to collect and analyse information from drug seizures
made in the UK. Apropos, the use case for ENDORSE is limited to a specific problem and a specific
crime type within one national jurisdiction. Furthermore, computer-related criminal activities can be
seen as a very complex problem, combining different types of traditional criminal activities with
different and innovative technologies for transcending jurisdictional boundaries.
The procedural requirements for a modern digital forensic framework aligned with CASE and
UCO, addressing the discussed paradox and the issues introduced by the modern information
environment are:
•

The Officer In Charge (OIC) must be enabled to identify physical and logical boundaries
(internal and external) that are within the scope of the investigation;

•

The OIC must be enabled to identify assets within the scope of the investigation;

•

The OIC must be enabled to identify, specify and direct the collection of specific types
of information;
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The investigative team (including relevant representatives from the environment under
investigation) must be enabled to clearly communicate the requirements (priorities and
essential elements of information);

•

The OIC must be enabled to identify systems and processes that will be used in the
collection phase as these may be organisation or technology specific;

•

The OIC must be enabled to develop an operational collection plan with specific
disciplines (HUMINT, SIGINT, OSINT) and methods for the intelligence based
collection of the evidence.

Additionally, any solution must not be disruptive to business and must be seen as a catalyst in
ensuring business continuity. Only then businesses may fully engage and allow for a truly integrated
and complete approach in the collection and analysis of data. The solution must also be modular,
portable, extensible and scalable. It must be complementary to SIEM strategies and make use of NOC
and SOC technologies. More importantly, a viable solution must be integrated into Risk Operations
Centres (ROC). Due to the intelligence-based nature of the solution (see requirements above) it is not
feasible for Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) to be in charge of the operational part of the collection
activities. Instead we argue that LEAs should only be responsible for the processing and analysis
phases (see following figure).

Figure 1. Relationship of data, information and intelligence [22]

5. Conclusions
While academic research is very good at developing frameworks and methodologies for digital
forensic processes, it does not have the resources (or the remit) to test tools. There are more than 20
frameworks and methodologies that have been proposed over the last two decades to try and address
the developing issues but, while essential, they can cause confusion as they add to the uncertainty
and do not present a standardised approach. There is a need for a purpose developed digital forensic
standard that will address current issues and is designed to meet the future challenges that the
changes in technology will bring to enable scientific rigour to be applied to the processes.
There is a need to develop processes and procedures that will facilitate the integration of law
enforcement and corporate resources at an operational level to support investigations. The reality is
that LEAs will increasingly have to rely on other organisations to capture data from large data stores
which may be outside of their jurisdiction and which may be using operating systems and
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applications that are outside their knowledge area and expertise, but need to be able to guide these
resources to achieve the highest levels of scientific rigour in the collection phase.
There is a need for education and additional training of the management of digital forensics
resources to ensure that they have the overview of the issues and potential resources and can manage
an intelligence led approach.
Given the characteristics of the modern information environment and the shortfalls of the current
digital forensic methodologies, we should establish new procedural boundaries (supported by
relevant legislation) spanning across the corporate and policing sectors. We should also fully
integrate the use of intelligence into digital forensics and make use of new and emerging technologies
throughout the TCP/IP stack.
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